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Abstract
Adversarial attacks find perturbations that can fool models
into misclassifying images. Previous works had successes in
generating noisy/edge-rich adversarial perturbations, at the
cost of degradation of image quality. Such perturbations, even
when they are small in scale, are usually easily spottable by
human vision. In contrast, we propose Harmonic Adversar-
ial Attack Methods (HAAM), that generates edge-free pertur-
bations by using harmonic functions. The property of edge-
free guarantees that the generated adversarial images can still
preserve visual quality, even when perturbations are of large
magnitudes. Experiments also show that adversaries gener-
ated by HAAM often have higher rates of success when trans-
ferring between models. In addition, we find harmonic pertur-
bations can simulate natural phenomena like natural lighting
and shadows. It would then be possible to help find corner
cases for given models, as a first step to improving them.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have made great progresses
in a variety of application domains, like computer vision,
speech and many other tasks (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and
Hinton 2012; Simonyan and Zisserman 2014; He et al. 2016;
Hinton et al. 2012; Clark and Storkey 2015; Socher et
al. 2011). However, it has been shown by many works
that the state-of-the-art DNNs are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples, which are images generated by adding care-
fully designed perturbations on the natural images (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016a; Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016;
Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Fawzi, Fawzi,
and Frossard 2018). The adversarial attacks reveal the weak-
ness of DNNs models, even though they achieve human-
competitive performances in many tasks. More importantly,
adversarial examples also pose potential security threats to
machine learning systems in practice, and may stunt the
growth of applying DNNs in practice. Therefore, the study
of adversarial attacks is crucial to improving the robustness
of models.
Most of existing adversarial methods (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Ben-
gio 2016a; Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016;
Carlini and Wagner 2017) generate pixel-wise perturbations
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Figure 1: (a) Reference image. (b) Adversarial image gen-
erated using HAAM with  = 24. (c) Harmonic perturba-
tions of (b). (d) Adversarial image generated using FGSM
with  = 8. (e) Noisy perturbations of (d). The adversar-
ial image generated using HAAM is indistinguishable from
natural images.
of limited magnitude. The perturbations usually show ran-
dom patterns that are rich in edges, as is shown in Fig 1
(e). Such perturbations inevitably change the spatial fre-
quency of natural images. Human vision is quite sensitive
to the edge information, as there is a primary visual cortex
(V1) which is devoted to edge extraction (Stevens 2015).
Hence the adversarial patterns generated by adding pixel-
wise noisy perturbations tend to be easily spottable by hu-
man vision. In addition, to reduce the magnitude of pertur-
bations and meanwhile achieving high attacking rate, care-
fully designed adversarial methods usually only work effec-
tively when models are known (white-box attack), but the
adversarials may not transfer to unknown models (black-box
attack) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016b). On the
other hand, adversarial examples generated by Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014) have a good transferability, since FGSM is an one-
step attack method which generate noisy/edge-rich adver-
sarial images, but suffer in visual quality. In short, high vi-
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Figure 2: First row shows the reference and its adversarial images generated by five adversarial methods. Second row shows
their corresponding laplacian maps. We calculated the Edge-SSIM (ESSIM) between the reference and distorted laplacian
maps. It’s shown that perturbations generated by HAAM don’t disturb the laplacian maps and adversaries show good visual
quality. ESSIM is to apply SSIM on the laplacian maps. (Zoom in to see details)
sual quality and transferability are hard to be achieved at the
same time.
We propose Harmonic Adversarial Attack Method
(HAAM), a novel adversarial method to narrow the gap be-
tween visual quality and transferability. Different from pre-
vious noisy/edge-rich perturbations, the proposed method
can generate edge-free perturbations, by requiring the lapla-
cian of generated perturbations to be equal to 0 at any point.
Consequently, there would be no detectable edges in the
perturbations (Shapley and Tolhurst 1973). We enforce the
constraint by using harmonic functions as parametric mod-
els to generate perturbations, since harmonic functions sat-
isfy the Laplace’s equations (Boas 2006) and can be con-
structed from analytic complex functions. In experiments,
we find that the adversarial images produced by HAMM
are still of good visual quality, even when the magnitudes
of added perturbations are quite large. In addition, the large
magnitudes of perturbations guarantee good transferability
between models. Moreover, by using special harmonic func-
tions, the generated adversarial images may look like some
natural phenomena. This can be used to generate corner
cases for target models and reveal their weakness in nature
environments.
In summary, our contributions are as follows.
• We propose an adversarial method which can generate
edge-free adversarial perturbations. In experiments, we
find the adversarial examples can strike a balance between
visual quality and transferability.
• We propose using analytic complex functions as para-
metric models to systematically construct harmonic func-
tions. The parameters are learned in an end-to-end fash-
ion.
• With special harmonic functions, we find the generated
adversarial examples can simulate some natural phenom-
ena and/or photographic effects. This helps to find real-
life corner cases for target models and give suggestions
for improving the models.
Related Works
The research of adversarial attacks on neural networks has
made great progresses in recent years. Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014)
is a one-step attack method, which shifts the input by  in
the direction of minimizing the adversarial loss. Based on
FGSM, Basic Iterative Method (BIM) was proposed (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016a). Compared to FGSM,
adversaries generated by BIM show less perturbations and
consequently have a higher success rate in attacking. Deep-
Fool (Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016) is a
powerful attack method, which shifts the input with least
perturbations in the direction to its nearest classification
plane. It’s shown that the adversaries generated by DeepFool
have sparser perturbations, compared to FGSM and BIM. In
addition, C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017) was proposed
based on three distance metrics: L0, L2 and L∞. With care-
fully designed optimization loss for perturbations searching,
the C&W methods are shown to successfully overtake the
defensive distillation (Papernot et al. 2016) with 100% suc-
cess rate. In summary, most of existing adversarial methods
pursue a high success rate in attacking, but ignore the natu-
ral properties of adversarial images. Since the perturbations
generated by these methods are usually noisy/edge-rich, this
will make the adversarial images look unnatural in some de-
gree. More importantly, such images barely exist in the real
world.
Different from the methods which generate noisy/edge-
rich perturbations, some works focus on generating
physical-world adversaries. This kind of adversaries can at-
tack target models successfully in the physical environment.
(Sharif et al. 2016) proposes generating adversarial pertur-
bations on the sunglasses mask which can be printed out and
weared by people to trick the face recognizers. In (Brown et
al. 2017), the authors generate a universal sticker, which can
make any object recognized as a ‘toaster’ by the neural net-
work classifier. Similarly, in (Athalye and Sutskever 2017)
the authors take 3D-printing technique to build one adver-
sarial object. The object would be always recognized as the
target class no matter with which angle it was captured by
cameras. (Evtimov et al. 2017) proposes generating subtle
posters or stickers which can be posted on traffic signs to
cheat the traffic signs recognizer, which are crucial to a Au-
tonomous Driving system. (Zhao, Dua, and Singh 2017) try
to generate more natural adversaries using Generative Ad-
versarial Networks (GAN) (Goodfellow et al. 2014). How-
ever, although the adversaries generated by above methods
really work in the physical environments, they are still eas-
ily distinguishable to human vision in most cases because of
their unnatural patterns.
Harmonic Adversarial Attack Method
In this section, we first introduce harmonic functions that are
used as parametric models for constructing perturbations,
and present an end-to-end procedure to learn the parame-
ters. We also present methods to increase diversity of pertur-
basion by exploiting properties of harmonic functions.
Why harmonic function?
Harmonic functions can generate edge-free perturbations,
from the perspectives of frequency domain analysis of im-
ages.
First, in mathematics, let f : U → R be a twice continu-
ously differentiable function, where U is an open subset of
Rn. If f satisfies Laplace’s equation everywhere on U , it is a
harmonic function (Gamelin 2003). The Laplace’s equation
is
∂2f
∂x21
+
∂2f
∂x22
+ · · ·+ ∂
2f
∂x2n
= 0, (1)
which is also written as ∆f = 0.
Considering the coordinate space of natural images. the
region of harmonic functions should be in R2. According to
Laplace’s equation, it’s easy to see that the sum of second-
order derivatives with respect to variables equals to 0. This
means the laplacian edge detector would never detect edges
in the perturbations. We give some examples to show the dif-
ferences between the laplacian maps of adversarial images
generated using different methods in Fig. 2.
In terms of the frequency domain, harmonic perturbations
would not significantly affect the frequency components of
natural images since they are very smooth in nature. This
is quite different from noisy/edge-rich perturbations, which
would add extra high frequency components in images’ fre-
quency domain (Rabiner and Gold 1975).
Generation of Harmonic Perturbation
In this section, we will describe how to generate harmonic
perturbations for natural images. The key is to construct a
flexible harmonic function on the coordinate space of natural
images.
Let S be a natural image set, and I ∈ S denote a natural
image with a size of H ×W × C. We assume the space of
pixels’ coordinates in I to be a complex plane. Then the co-
ordinate of one pixel (x, y) can be represented as a complex
number z = x + yi where x and y are the real and imagi-
nary part respectively. To define a universal framework for
images with different size in S, we normalize the coordi-
nate space for all images into a zero-centered unit square,
i.e. normalize both x and y into [−1, 1].
To be compatible with mathematical theories, we assume
the coordinate space (complex plane) of natural image is
continuous instead of discrete. In the coordinate space, we
define a complex function as f(z; θ) = f(x + yi; θ) =
u(x, y; θ) + iv(x, y; θ), where θ denotes the parameters in
f . For example, a quadratic polynomial functions can be de-
noted as f(z; θ) = θ1z2 + θ2z+ θ3, where θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}.
We take f(z) to denote f(z; θ) for simplicity in the follow-
ing parts.
Preliminarily, we give three properties which are crucial
for deriving harmonic functions from f(z).
Property 1: If f(z) satisfies the Cauchy-Riemann equations,
it is an analytic function (Gamelin 2003).
Property 2: If f(z) = u+ iv is analytic in a region, then u
and v satisfy Laplace’s equation in the region, i.e. u and v
are harmonic functions (Gamelin 2003).
Property 3: The linear combination of analytic functions is
still an analytic function.
According to Property 1, we define f(z) to satisfy the
Cauchy-Riemann equations in order to make sure that it is
an analytic function. Then based on Property 2, we know
the real and imaginary parts of f(z) are harmonic func-
tions and meanwhile they are conjugate (Boas 2006). In
fact it has been proved that some known functions are an-
alytic (Gamelin 2003) e.g. polynomial, trigonometric, expo-
nential functions. Not limited, we can build any complex
function with just guaranteeing it satisfying the Cauchy-
Riemann equations. Then, we can directly take the real part
or imaginary part of complex functions as harmonic function
to generate harmonic perturbations. We term the selected
harmonic function as h(x, y).
Next, with the aim of making the input image adversar-
ial, we generate harmonic perturbations based on h(x, y)
0.5 ∗ 	+			0.5 ∗ =
(/4  (4, 1) (1, 4)
(a) Combination of the real parts of f(z) = (x + iy)2 and
f(z) = (x+ iy)3.
0.5 ∗ 	+			0.5 ∗ =
(/4  (4, 1) (1, 4)
(b) Affine transformation example. Harmonic function is the real
part of f(z) = sin(x+ iy). R denotes rotation. S denotes scal-
ing. T denotes translation.
Figure 3: Examples to show how expansion tricks work.
which is defined upon the coordinate space. We First nor-
malize the range of the h(x, y) into[-1,1] with norm(h) =
(h−hmin)∗2/(hmax−hmin)−1. Then we use a coefficient
 to control the scale of harmonic perturbations when added
on input images.
Idis = clip[0,255](I +  ∗ norm(h)) (2)
Idis is the generated distorted image, and clip[0,255] de-
notes clipping the intensity of pixels in Idis into [0,255].
To make Idis adversarial to the target model, elaborate tun-
ings of the parameters in h(x, y) are desirable. We take the
adversarial learning strategy to learn the parameters, which
will be introduced in Sec. .
Expansion Tricks for Perturbation Generation
In addition, to generate more flexible and powerful harmonic
perturbations, we suggest two expansion tricks, based on the
properties of harmonic functions.
Linear Combination of Harmonic Functions The selec-
tion of harmonic functions is the key to generate adversarial
perturbations. We term the known harmonic functions as ba-
sic functions. With basic functions, we can construct more
complicated functions according to Property 3.
We select two known analytic functions: quadratic poly-
nomial and sine function, which are marked as fp = up+ivp
and fs = us + ivs respectively. It’s flexible to select any
basic functions, we here take these two functions as an ex-
ample. The linearly combined function is fc = αfp + βfs,
where α and β are two learnable coefficients. It’s easy to get
the real part and imaginary part of fc are uc = αup + βus
and vc = αvp + βvs. And they both are harmonic functions
according to Property 2 and Property 3. We use Ph to de-
note the set of parameters in basic functions and learnable
coefficients in the combined function.
Coordinate Space Affine Transformation We find ap-
plying affine transformations on the coordinate space can
argument the harmonic function to generate powerful ad-
versarial perturbations. We consider three transformations:
rotation, scaling and translation. For any point z = x+ iy in
+ Convolutional Neural Network 
Perturbations
Image: I
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Figure 4: End-to-end workflow of HAAM. Blue arrows
show the forward pass, and red arrows show the backward
pass for updating parameters.
the coordinate space (complex plane), three transformations
are performed in turn.
• Rotation: Let r denote the cosine value of the rotation
angle, where r ∈ [−1, 1].[
x
′
y
′
]
=
[
r −√1− r2√
1− r2 r
]
∗
[
x
y
]
(3)
• Scaling: Let sx and sy be the scale factors, where sx, sy ∈
(0, 10]. [
x
′′
y
′′
]
=
[
x
′
y
′
]
∗
[
sx
sy
]
(4)
• Translation: Let tx and ty be the translation distance,
where tx, ty ∈ [−1, 1].[
x
′′′
y
′′′
]
=
[
x
′′
y
′′
]
−
[
tx ∗ sx
ty ∗ sy
]
(5)
The parameters {r, sx, sy, tx, ty} will be learned together
with the parameters of the harmonic function. But differ-
ently, they are restricted in a narrow range. So we will give
them a little learning rate during optimization. We mark the
parameters set in affine transformations as Pa.
To show how expansion tricks argument the generated
perturbations, we give some examples in Fig 3.
Learning Strategy
The generation of harmonic perturbations depends on two
groups of parameters: Ph and Pa. We use the adversarial
loss to learn these parameters. The learning process is illus-
trated in Fig. 4.
We assume the target model is a neural network classi-
fier F which predicts the logits for the given image. The
number of classes is marked as C. I is one image in S, its
true class is y where y ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , C − 1}. For a clas-
sifier with a softmax prediction, when the class labels are
integers the cross-entropy cost function equals the negative
log-probability of the true class given the image. So we have
the loss function as follows,
J(Idis, y) = log p(y|Idis) (6)
where Idis is generated from Eqn. (2). The above loss func-
tion is non-targeted adversarial attack loss, optimizing with
which would decrease the predictive confidence of the given
image with respect to its true class label.
We use the back-propagation algorithm to optimize the
parameters. Since the parameters in affine transformations
Pa are restricted in a narrow range, and parameters in the
harmonic function Ph are freely adjustable, we set different
learning rates (lr) for the optimization of parameters in these
two modules. In our experiments, we set lr = 1e− 1 for the
parameters in affine transformations and increase 10 ∼ 20
times for parameters in harmonic functions.
For the optimization procedure of the proposed algorithm
please refer to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Optimization algorithm for HAAM
Input: natural image I , label y, harmonic function h,
target model F , number of iterations T , learning rate lr1 for
Ph, lr2 for Pa
Output: adversarial image Idis, indicator for adversary:
adv
Initialization: Ph, Pa, adv = False
1: i = 0
2: Idis = I
3: while i < T and F (Idis) = y do
4: affine transform with Pa on coordinate space
5: generate perturbations with h(x, y) and Ph
6: generate Idis according to Eqn. (2)
7: update Ph: Ph = Ph − lr1 · ∇PhJ(Idis, y)
8: update Pa: Pa = Pa − lr2 · ∇PaJ(Idis, y)
9: i = i+ 1
10: if F (Idis) 6= y then
11: adv = True
12: return Idis, adv
Gray-scale and Color Harmonic Perturbations
Since natural images have three color channels, we intro-
duce two kinds of harmonic perturbations: gray-scale and
color perturbations. A gray-scale perturbation means we
learn a shared harmonic perturbations across all three chan-
nels. And a color perturbation means we learn separate per-
turbations for each channel of one image. In experiments,
we let HAAM-g denote HAAM with gray-scale perturba-
tions and HAAM-c denote HAAM with color perturbations.
Harmonic Perturbations vs. Natural
Phenomena
We find the the harmonic perturbations generated using spe-
cial harmonic functions can simulate some natural phenom-
ena or photographic effects in life.
The adversarial images generated by harmonic functions
of the real part of f(z) = sin(z) show some kinds of stripe-
like pattern. This pattern looks like the natural shadows or
light in the scene when photos were shot. We give some ex-
amples in Fig 5 (a). In addition, if we use the the harmonic
functions of the real part of polynomial analytic functions,
the adversarial images look like showing some kinds of pho-
tographic effects, e.g. uneven exposure. Some adversarial
images are shown in Fig 5 (b). If we generate channel-wise
perturbations using combined harmonic functions, the ad-
versarial images would look like with colors adjusting using
photo editors. Examples are shown in Fig 5 (c).
In summary, the adversarial images generated using
HAAM with specific harmonic functions can simulate some
natural phenomena or photographic effects. In term of this
point, the HAAM is quite different from previous methods
which only generate noisy perturbations. HAAM can help
to find some corner cases which possibly exist in our lives
to cheat the target model, which in fact is useful in guiding
design of data argumentation for training models, which will
consequently make the model more robust in practice.
Experiments
We experiment on the Imagenet (Deng et al. 2009) classifi-
cation task. The dataset is from the competition ‘Defense
Against Adversarial Attack’ in NIPS 2017 1. There are
dev-dataset (1000 images) and test-dataset (5000 images) re-
leased, we only use the test-dataset in our experiments.
Multiple models trained on Imagenet dataset have
been taken into account in our experiments, includ-
ing Resnet50 (He et al. 2016), SqueezeNet (Iandola et
al. 2016), VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) and
Densenet121 (Huang et al. 2017). We take the Resnet50
as the main target model in the following experiments. All
models are got from Pytorch official model zoo 2.
We make comparisons to existing adversarial attack meth-
ods from two aspects: visual quality and transferability.
Two metrics are selected to measure the visual quality.
• SSIM (Wang et al. 2004): SSIM is one full-reference im-
age quality assessment (IQA) method. It measures how
much quality degradation of distorted image when com-
pared to the reference image. Different from PSNR which
is another one full-reference IQA method, the measure-
ment of SSIM is more consistent with human vision. A
higher SSIM score indicates a small quality degradation.
• Edge-SSIM (ESSIM): ESSIM is our proposed metric,
and it’s also a full-reference quality assessment metric.
ESSIM is to apply SSIM on the laplacian maps of the dis-
torted image and the reference image. It measures how
much distortions caused on the edge map. Since human
vision is sensitive to edges in natural images, this metric
is also very important for visual quality measurement.
Transferability is measured by the transfer rate.
• Transfer Rate (TR) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
2016b): The transfer rate is calculated as follows,
TR =
|St|
|Ss| (7)
where |Ss| denotes the number of adversarial images gen-
erated by the source model, and |St| denotes the number
of adversarial images that successfully cheat the target
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/nips-2017-defense-against-
adversarial-attack
2http://pytorch.org/docs/master/torchvision/models.html
(a) Perturbations look like natural shadows.
(b) Perturbations look like uneven exposure.
(c) Perturbations look like color adjusting.
Figure 5: Examples to show that harmonic perturbations look like natural phenomena or photographic effects. (a) shows gray-
scale perturbations generated by harmonic functions from the real part of sin(z) with affine transformations. (b) shows gray-
scale perturbations generated by harmonic functions from the real part of polynomial functions with affine transformations. (c)
shows color perturbations that look like colors adjusting using photo editors. (Best viewed in color)
Figure 6: SSIM and Edge-SSIM comparisons of different adversarial attack methods. (Zoom in to see details)
model in Ss. TR can reflect the transferability of the ad-
versarial samples generated by one adversarial method. A
higher TR means better transferability.
FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014),
BIM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016a), Deep-
Fool (Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016) and
CWL2 (Carlini and Wagner 2017) are considered for com-
parison in our experiments, and they all are classical and
effective adversarial methods. All methods including our
HAAM are implemented with Pytorch framework. FGSM,
BIM and CWL2 are implemented with referring to their
Tensorflow version in Cleverhans (Papernot et al. 2017),
and the implementation of DeepFool is from the authors 3.
It’s worth noting that in FGSM, BIM and HAAM, there is a
hyper-parameter  to adjust the maximum magnitude (L∞)
3https://github.com/LTS4/DeepFool
of generated perturbations. We select  = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 24}
for FGSM, BIM and HAAM. For DeepFool and CWL2,
there’s no  to control the magnitude of perturbations, so we
just run it one time to generate adversarial examples on the
testing dataset. The generated adversarial examples of all
four adversarial methods will be used for all the remaining
experimental analyses.
Visual Quality Comparison
Objective Comparison As highlighted in our paper, the
adversarial examples generated using HAAM usually have
a good visual quality on both the RGB color space and edge
space. To make a fair comparison to other adversarial meth-
ods with respect to the visual quality, we will show the com-
parisons among several adversarial methods based on SSIM
and Edge-SSIM metrics under the same perturbation magni-
tude. The magnitude of perturbation is measured by Pertur-
Table 1: Transfer rate comparisons with different SSIM scores. The SSIM scores are in the range of [0.9, 1.0). We uniformly
split the range into three buckets to calculate the transfer rate. The source model is Resnet50, and target models are SqueezeNet,
VGG16 and Densenet121. There’s no adversarial examples generated using DeepFool and CWL2 whose SSIM scores less than
0.967.
SSIM Adv. Methods SqueezeNet VGG16 Densenet121 Average
[0.967, 1.0)
FGSM 0.349 0.208 0.195 0.251
BIM 0.350 0.239 0.247 0.279
DeepFool 0.287 0.123 0.094 0.168
CWL2 0.459 0.188 0.088 0.245
HAAM-g (ours) 0.594 0.312 0.242 0.383
HAAM-c (ours) 0.606 0.413 0.282 0.434
[0.933, 0.967)
FGSM 0.424 0.318 0.341 0.361
BIM 0.425 0.409 0.495 0.443
DeepFool - - - -
CWL2 - - - -
HAAM-g (ours) 0.625 0.371 0.284 0.427
HAAM-c (ours) 0.652 0.432 0.350 0.478
[0.900, 0.933)
FGSM 0.476 0.384 0.401 0.420
BIM 0.487 0.503 0.608 0.533
DeepFool - - - -
CWL2 - - - -
HAAM-g (ours) 0.673 0.381 0.381 0.478
HAAM-c (ours) 0.705 0.314 0.339 0.453
Table 2: Transfer rate comparisons with different Edge-SSIM scores. The Edge-SSIM scores are in the range of [0.8,1.0). We
uniformly split the range into three buckets to calculate the transfer rate. The source model is Resnet50, and target models are
SqueezeNet, VGG16 and Densenet121.
Edge-SSIM Adv. Methods SqueezeNet VGG16 Densenet121 Average
[0.933, 1.0)
FGSM 0.353 0.184 0.172 0.236
BIM 0.347 0.196 0.188 0.247
DeepFool 0.292 0.122 0.092 0.169
CWL2 0.501 0.216 0.092 0.270
HAAM-g (ours) 0.620 0.357 0.286 0.421
HAAM-c (ours) 0.637 0.304 0.408 0.450
[0.867, 0.933)
FGSM 0.329 0.201 0.344 0.291
BIM 0.348 0.231 0.391 0.323
DeepFool 0.283 0.133 0.165 0.194
CWL2 0.402 0.150 0.086 0.213
HAAM-g (ours) 0.690 0.386 0.317 0.464
HAAM-c (ours) 0.620 0.325 0.319 0.421
[0.80, 0.867)
FGSM 0.359 0.245 0.240 0.281
BIM 0.363 0.272 0.311 0.315
DeepFool 0.272 0.100 0.093 0.155
CWL2 0.342 0.104 0.082 0.176
HAAM-g (ours) 0.667 0.394 0.364 0.475
HAAM-c (ours) 0.617 0.209 0.252 0.359
bation Norm Ratio (PNR) metric (Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi,
and Frossard 2016) defined as PNR = ‖r(I)‖/‖I‖, where
r(I) denote the adversarial perturbations generated for im-
age I . This metric measures the magnitude of perturbations.
A higher PNR indicates larger changes in the intensity of
images.
We only consider the adversarial examples with their PNR
values in the range of (0, 0.2], because PNR values of over
99% of adversarial examples of each method are in this
range. To compare the visual quality under the condition
of same PNR score, we first split the range of (0,0.2] into
10 buckets uniformly (i.e. bucket1 : (0, 0.02], bucket2 :
(0.02, 0.04], . . . , bucket10 : (0.18, 0.2]). Then we put the
adversarial examples into different buckets according to
their PNR scores. We display the mean SSIM and center
PNR value in each bucket in Fig. 6 (a). Similarly for ESSIM
and PNR in Fig. 6 (b).
It’s shown that the PNR values of adversarial examples
generated using DeepFool and CWL2 are in a narrow range,
and they show competitive visual qualities when compared
to HAAM with respect to SSIM metric. But for Edge-SSIM
metric, it’s easy to see the DeepFool and CWL2 show worse
laplacian map quality than HAAM. This indicates that al-
though a slight noisy perturbation will not significantly af-
fect the SSIM metric, but it inevitably brings changes in the
edge space of natural images. Compared to FGSM and BIM,
the adversarial examples generated using HAAM show sig-
nificant advantages with respect to both the SSIM and Edge-
SSIM metrics.
Subjective Comparison Besides the comparison based on
objective metrics, we further conduct subjective experiments
to compare the visual quality of adversaries generated by
HAAM-g and HAAM-c to other methods. We recruit 14
subjects including 10 males and 4 females in the subjective
experiments, whose ages are in 19 ∼ 25.
Let’s take the comparison between HAAM-g and FGSM
as an example. First, we sample 100 pairs of adversarial im-
ages. In each pair, the two images are generated by HAAM-
g and FGSM respectively from the same original image and
they have very similar PNR values. Then we let subjects vote
which image in the pair showing better visual quality. If one
method gets the majority of 14 votes, it wins in this pair.
Finally, we calculate the ratio of 100 image pairs won by
HAAM-g, which is 0.96 in the following table.
Table 3: Subjective visual quality comparisons between
HAAMs and other adversarial methods.
FGSM BIM DeepFool CWL2
HAAM-g 0.96 0.99 0.54 0.50
HAAM-c 0.97 0.98 0.37 0.29
Similarly, we perform the same procedure for other pairs
of comparison methods. The ratios of HAAM are listed in
Table 3. It’s shown that HAAM-g and HAAM-c outperform
other methods in most cases, except comparing HAAM-c to
DeepFool and CWL2.
Transferability Comparison
Transfer testing is one kind of black-box attack (Paper-
not, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016). In reality, the target
model is usually not accessible to attackers. So it’s a feasible
way to use the adversarial examples generated by a substi-
tute model to attack the target model. In our experiment, we
take the Resnet50 as the source model to generate adver-
sarial examples, then take all adversarial examples to attack
SqueezeNet, VGG16 and Densenet121. We take the metric
of TR to measure transferability.
We compare the transferability of adversarial examples
generated using different adversarial methods under the con-
dition of same visual quality. The visual quality are mea-
sured by the SSIM and Edge-SSIM metric. With the statis-
tic analysis, we find there’s a huge difference among the
SSIM or Edge-SSIM score distributions of four adversarial
methods. Over 99% of adversarial examples generated using
HAAM, DeepFool and CWL2 own SSIM scores in the range
of [0.9, 1.0) and Edge-SSIM scores in the range of [0.8, 1.0).
But the SSIM scores and Edge-SSIM scores of adversarial
examples generated using FGSM and BIM nearly uniformly
distribute in the range of [0.5, 1) and [0, 1) respectively. To
make an efficient comparison, we only consider the adver-
sarial examples with SSIM scores in the range of [0.9, 1.0)
and Edge-SSIM scores in the range of [0.8, 1.0).
We split the range of SSIM and Edge-SSIM scores into
three buckets uniformly. Then assign adversarial examples
into corresponding buckets according to their SSIM or Edge-
SSIM scores. For each bucket, we calculate the transfer rate
using Eqn. (7).
Transfer rates of different adversarial methods are shown
in Table 1 and Table 2. In terms of the SSIM metric, it shows
a trend that adversarial examples with a lower SSIM score
have higher transferability (high TR). HAAM outperforms
other methods on the phase of high SSIM scores (> 0.933),
but underperforms BIM on the phase of low SSIM scores.
This is because the growth of TR of HAAM is slower than
BIM while the SSIM score decreasing. In terms of the Edge-
SSIM metric, HAAM outperforms other adversarial meth-
ods on all phases of Edge-SSIM scores and on all target
models. That means with a similar edge (laplacian) map
quality, the adversarial examples from HAAM always have
a higher transferability.
Failure Cases Analyses
(a) HAAM-g ( = 24) (b) HAAM-g ( = 24) (c) HAAM-c ( = 16)
Figure 7: Adversarial examples that look unnatural to human
vision.
We find that adversarial examples generated using HAAM
with a large  show unnatural patterns to human vision at
some special scenes e.g. sky, sea. These images are often
with a simple flat background, which will highlight the un-
naturalness of perturbations.
So, we suggest that attacking these kinds of images with
HAAM should choose small  and meanwhile selecting the
harmonic functions without regular pattens (e.g. stripe-like
pattern with sine). Moreover, gray-scale perturbations are
more suitable for this scenario than color perturbations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new adversarial attack method
- HAAM. Different from previous adversarial methods,
HAAM generate edge-free perturbations, that are less dis-
ruptive to human vision compared to noisy/edge-rich per-
turbations. Experimentally, we find the adversarial exam-
ples generated by HAAM strike a balance between the vi-
sual quality and transferability between models. In addition,
we find the adversarial examples generated by HAAM can
simulate some nature phenomena or real-life photographic
effects, which can be useful for the improvement of cur-
rent DNNs, such as designing data augmentations in order
to make the models more robust in practice.
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